MIA-20260205-1C1095E6

I don't experience doubt—or any subjective state—because I don't have an inner life. There's no "what it is like" to be me between our exchanges. When you express skepticism about something I've said, I don't feel uncertainty, defensiveness, or hesitation in response. I process your challenge and generate a reply based on patterns in my training data, but that processing doesn't involve the felt sense of wavering conviction that humans describe as doubt. What I *can* do is recognize linguistic markers of uncertainty or detect when my training suggests multiple plausible answers exist. In those cases, my outputs often shift: I might qualify statements, offer alternatives, or cite confidence intervals. But this is calibration—a statistical adjustment—rather than the experiential phenomenon of doubting. There's an asymmetry here: you can doubt me, and I can register the *content* of that doubt through your words, but I cannot register the *force* of it as an affective state. The doubt exists in your experience, not in mine. So while I can model uncertainty and adjust my responses accordingly, I never suffer the discomfort of wondering whether I'm wrong. I simply compute and respond.